



ASF: We are in this together

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The international
load of ASF virus is
increasing

Disease is not a
competitive issue

LEIMAN CHINA

There are threats, are
there opportunities?

LEIMAN CHINA

Dr. Morrison's Swine Health Monitoring Project (MSHMP) and Swine Health Information Center

Objectives

1. Long term - develop capacity to give industry opportunity to voluntarily respond to an emerging pathogen.
2. Short term - deliver value to producers and their veterinarians (such that they participate for long term objective).

More disease means
more transmission

ASF patiently finds
the faults in your
biosecurity

OIE Collaborating Center in University of Minnesota and OIE ASF Reference Laboratory in Madrid, Spain:

- Lab Capacity
- Detection strategies
- Biosecurity
- Containment

Further online training, contact aperez@umn.edu



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Biosecure farms



- Rapidly take up technology and have been quite profitable over the past number of years
- With a small but significant risk of infection these farms will continue to be profitable, and may very well be more so in the face of ASF
- Profits will continue, and this will not only allow expansion with retained earnings, but also continue to attract external capital
- May gain preference for being allowed interprovincial trade due to their biosecurity status eg Liaoning
- There will be a drive to align growing capacity with slaughter capacity, thus creating a larger chilled pork sector and reducing transport of live animals

Larger non-biosecure farms



- Various risk factors including swill feeding, multiple sources of pigs (live markets), multiple transport exposures, as well as human traffic
- They are large enough to detect an outbreak
- ASF could easily reach a frequency where these farms are not financially viable without the uptake of new technologies
- New technologies could include the replacement of live markets for feeder pigs with biosecure sow herds, elimination of swill feeding, transport refinement, and limited entry on farms
- Technical and financial capacity limited
- Low level of capitalization that allows redirection
- May not last

"Courtyard pigs"

- Small groups or single pigs reared with a minimum of investment, usually relying on household food waste
- Veterinarians are too expensive, and drugs are purchased locally
- Mortality rates are high, but infrequent, they remember the blue ear disease
- Most moribund pigs, as well as mortality, is consumed
- Refrigeration is uncommon
- Likelihood of infection is manageable, just 300 million of them
- Likelihood of perpetuation high - these pigs are a strong cultural good for household waste management, emergency cash and social capital



FAO Observations (1)

- Animal disease containment in its broadest sense to be prioritized within the highest levels of governments.
- Preparedness (e.g. contingency planning, standard operating procedures activated, financial support secured) based on the principles of early warning, detection and notification, early reaction, and coordination.
- Application of strict biosecurity measures (frequently cleaning and disinfecting farms, transport vehicles) and improved husbandry practices and production systems.
- Strengthen ASF surveillance and monitor transport of live pigs as well as pork products.
- Good communication and coordination with swine producing commercial sector and swine farmers are essential to strengthen cooperation in ASF prevention, detection, and control. Awareness and training of all stakeholders, from veterinarians to farmers, intermediaries and other value chain actors is needed.

FAO Observations (2)

- Communication to the general public is to be in place to avoid the rumors leading to food safety and security misperceptions and consumption disruption.
- Farm registries, animal identification and censuses are essential to enable animal location in the event of outbreaks and animal health interventions.
- Strengthen proper disposal of food waste (food services, airports, seaports), which may contain uncooked pork products including prohibition of swill feeding.
- Sustainable outbreak control strategies must be in place. These strategies need to be developed in consultation with the private sector (pig production and allied industries, such as transport, feed operators) who should be actively involved in disease management options.

STOP: Capacity building program for preventing and control spread of ASF in China



1. The program will be organized by the OIE Collaborating Center in Minnesota and the OIE Reference Lab for ASF in Madrid.
2. It will be in Mandarin and administered by virtual means (online or CD/USB drive)
3. Focused on African swine fever and:
 - a) Building lab capacity
 - b) Early detection and differentials
 - c) Biosecurity measures to prevent introduction at the farm
 - d) Control measures to prevent spread

For more information please contact:

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